Devo, democracy and local government's constitutional future

The constitutional position of local government is probably not the first thing on the minds of councillors or officers. Nevertheless, I found it striking that the 2024 Devolution White Paper was replete with constitutional language.Ministers promised ‘constitutional autonomy' for local government, with devolution embedded as a ‘default' into the UK constitution. But, what did it mean by ‘constitutional autonomy'? This was never explained, leading me to consider the puzzle in more detail in an Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham paper.With a new Prime Minister to be unveiled in a few weeks' time, the discussion could gain renewed relevance.I ask three questions. First, what could constitutional protection for local government look like, given that parliamentary sovereignty will continue in the foreseeable future and a codified constitution is not on any mainstream political agenda?Second: What does the 2026 English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act deliver, with respect to the constitutional aspirations expressed in the White Paper?The third question is how thinking about constitutional entrenchment can reinforce arguments for strengthening the sector. Much of the debate revolves around strategic authorities. I argue that constitutional entrenchment must encompass the whole of sub-national government, including principal local authorities, neighbourhoods and parishes.To answer the first question of what constitutional protection could look like, I draw on the work of Alison Young, professor of public law at the University of Cambridge. She identifies a range of quasi-constitutional protections that government could introduce through enhanced legislation, such as by requiring super-majorities or referenda to repeal it. She argues that there is meaningful constitutional space between the polarities of a codified constitution on the one hand and untrammelled parliamentary sovereignty on the other.My paper works with Young's proposition and its implications for local government. However, we already know from the fate of the Fixed Term Parliament Act that Parliament can ultimately repeal any legislation, enhanced or not. For this reason, constitutional entrenchment by legal means will only work if it is also possible to create economic, political and cultural conditions capable of deterring a future centralising government. I suggest that constitutional entrenchment depends on a mix of the enhanced legislation proposed by Young and complementary actions to further embed the sustainability, legitimacy and sense of democratic entitlement within the sector.What is the point of this endeavour? While it may appear as a distraction to colleagues busy trying to keep a beleaguered sector running, the Government's use of constitutional language opens the door to a serious debate about how to enhance local government in ways that are also linked with the challenges of financial sustainability, functional bandwidth and democratic legitimacy.Debating the constitutional position of the sector also provides us with a different vantage point for evaluating the 2026 Act.If nothing else, the language of constitutional entrenchment creates a high bar through which to hold central government to account for its actions and pushes the case for strong local government. Any formal legal protections will remain hollow unless they are attached to political and financial revitalisation measures sufficient to inspire the public defence of local government and make repeal unattractive for a future hostile government.In answer to the second question, the Act does not live up to the lofty constitutional rhetoric of the White Paper. Whatever its other merits, devolution does not protect local government in the way Young envisions. For example, no referendum locks or super-majorities are required to repeal devolutionary provisions. Weighed against Young's entrenchment mechanisms, the Act is just ordinary primary legislation, readily repealable by any future Parliament. It does not even go so far as to provide a statutory platform for the central-local partnership mechanisms.Moreover, the Act retains broad Henry VIII powers permitting ministers to rewrite the devolution framework through secondary legislation. A statute that contains the tools by which devolution could be dismantled is in some way the reverse of a constitutional act and exhibits many of the worst traits in the centralising British political tradition.In the final part of the paper I consider my third question of what could practically be done to enhance the constitutional position of local government. One suggestion is for a national convention to codify the roles and responsibilities of different tiers of government in England and the UK by creating subsidiarity rules and incorporating the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The convention could then be enshrined in constitutional statutes.For example, to provide a layer of constitutional protection, the law could contain a ‘manner and form' requirement. This means that repeal would require a high-bar procedure, such as a parliamentary super-majority and/or a public referendum. This requirement could then be doubly embedded by requiring that the high-bar procedure could itself only be changed by the same procedure. Young sees this as the strongest possible protection, short of a codified constitution.Young recognises that such measures would not impede a determinedly sovereigntist government. However, they could reframe the debate by according local government formal recognition and legitimacy that devolution alone does not.If nothing else, the language of constitutional entrenchment creates a high bar through which to hold central government to account for its actions and pushes the case for strong local government. Any formal legal protections will remain hollow unless they are attached to political and financial revitalisation measures sufficient to inspire the public defence of local government and make repeal unattractive for a future hostile government.Constitution-making is no panacea. My wager is that devolution is more likely to flourish if the Government's own constitutional language is taken up and used as leverage, both with citizens and within the corridors of power.Professor Jonathan S Davies is associate at the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham. His paper, Constitutionalising English Sub-National Government? An Overview of the Debate and Directions of Travel, is published by INLOGOV, University of Birmingham

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DEVOLUTION

Devo, democracy and local government's constitutional future

By Jonathan S Davies | 02 July 2026

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