In the midst of political turmoil, a new prime minister arrives promising to do things differently: to break the paralysis in Westminster and prioritise the ‘left behind' places of England, honouring their desire for more say and control over what happens.
The new PM has held high office before. But it is his prolonged experience as mayor of one of England's largest cities that seems to underpin his governing philosophy, and perhaps his appeal across the political spectrum. He has shown that he can win where few others from his party could.
That experience may also contain an Achilles' heel. This is a politician who loves to be loved and hates to disappoint. In national politics, he will more frequently have to confront the reality that some challenges cannot be tackled without unpopular trade-offs. Will that prove sustainable?
The year is 2019, and the new PM is not Andy Burnham, but Boris Johnson.
The comparison only goes so far. But if the question is ‘what would a Burnham administration mean in policy terms?', the Johnson record may still be illuminating.
It was no coincidence that a former mayor, alert to the need to give communities greater efficacy after Brexit, should launch a major ‘levelling up' programme. That programme did not reduce regional inequality as promised. But it did help renew the push for subnational devolution, providing momentum that the current Labour government has sustained through its ‘devolution revolution'.
Burnham can be expected to go further in both areas. The Treasury is already considering fiscal devolution more seriously, and that agenda will likely become more important with Burnham as prime minister. His sympathy for bottom-up public services, place-based thinking and community empowerment may also lead him to build a broader programme around those values.
It will not be called ‘levelling up 2.0', but some will describe it that way. This agenda would be strengthened by allies such as Lisa Nandy, a longstanding advocate of community-led approaches, and Miatta Fahnbulleh, closely associated with Burnham's emerging policy project.
There would, however, be three principal constraints on Burnham's approach.
The first is that, as a mid-term replacement, he would lack his own distinctive mandate. His most ambitious ideas on constitutional reform or the machinery of government are therefore unlikely to emerge before a general election. He spoke at length about proportional representation when I interviewed him last year, but Starmer's manifesto would still feel binding.
The second constraint is financial. Fiscal rules, high public debt and undertakings not to raise taxes further would bind Burnham's administration as surely as they have Starmer's. This would not rule out radical policy, but pursuing it would require an explicit decision to deprioritise something else.
The third concerns the team around him in Number 10 and at the Cabinet table. Burnham would feel pressure to appoint a Cabinet capable of unifying the Labour Party. His choices of Chancellor and Foreign Secretary would be crucial.
Fiscal devolution navigates all three constraints, which is why I expect it to become a major focus. It is already in progress, can persist under any Chancellor, and is an agenda to which Burnham could add greater passion and ambition. It also offers a route to tax reform that could make better use of existing revenues without immediately breaching promises on national tax rises.
Re:State's proposals in Taxing for take-off set out how strategic authorities could first receive an assigned share of income tax, beginning with the equivalent of 2.5p on the basic rate and replacing existing integrated settlements. Equalisation would protect places with weaker tax bases, while stronger audit arrangements, local public accounts committees and clearer accounting-officer responsibilities would reinforce accountability. Over time, regions could gain notable tax-varying powers, alongside deeper reforms to accountability systems and council tax.
For Burnham, the attraction may be impossible to resist. This would give local leaders a direct stake in growth, reduce dependence on Whitehall bidding rounds and allow him to argue that devolution was finally being matched by fiscal power.
Something similar could happen – whisper it – in social care. Louise Casey seems likely to push hard within her terms of reference, and I would not be surprised if Burnham sought to accelerate the process and make the establishment of a ‘national care service', whatever that might mean in practice, a signature accomplishment of his government. There are few public services more in need of fundamental change.
The arithmetic of scarcity will still prevail, even if the new leadership is fluent in the language of abundance. If Burnham wants to turn Manchesterism into a national governing philosophy, he will have to begin with something almost unprecedented: devolving power just as he has finally seized it.
Simon Kaye is director of policy and research at Re:State
